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ABSTRACT
This study examined the framework institutionalised for the protection of
consumers in Nigeria.  In particular, it x-rayed the administrative and regulatory
mechanisms  put  in  place for  the  protection  of  consumers and  considered  the
attitude of  the courts in  matters  affecting  the consumers.  It was evidenced from
the study that there are several regulatory agencies, with functions sometimes
overlapping, set up to advance the consumer's course. The effectiveness of these
agencies is brought into scrutiny, as sometimes, their existence is hardly known
to the consumers. The study exposed a general lacklustre approach of the courts
in consumer protection cases and its adverse effect on the consumers. If the
consumer is to take benefit of whatever legal framework institutionalised for his
protection in Nigeria, some level of judicial activism are required.
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INTRODUCTION
Consumption is the essence of production of goods and services. The process of
production would be worthless if the products of that process are not consumed. In
Nigeria however, the incidence of fake, substandard, defective and adulterated product
assumes an alarming dimension. The quality of services rendered by service providers
leaves much to be desired. The consumer is left in a precarious position, having to
pay for shoddy services, sometimes no services, and for goods that are below the
regulated standards. Consumers of goods and services have been exposed to myriad
of problems including problem of safety and quality of product and service.
Some framework has been institutionalised to address these consumer
problems. These take the form of administrative interventions that regulate the
activities of manufacturers and suppliers of goods and providers of services.
Furthermore, the courts are there to enforce consumer legislation and award
appropriate remedies to aggrieved consumers. This study analyses the existing
framework for the protection of consumers in Nigeria. To achieve the objective of
this study some cases that relate to consumer protection have been critically appraised
to determine the attitude of Nigerian courts towards consumers protection.
A consumer is broadly defined as a person who buys or uses goods and
services1. This definition imports contractual nexus into the concept of consumer.
It presupposes that the consumer retains his freedom; freedom to choose what and
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service. The consumer is therefore someone who acts freely and is not in any way
coerced or forced into the relation. The pertinent question is whether the consumer
needs to be protected from his own ignorance and failure to exercise due diligence
in freely exercising his right of choice to purchase and, or use a product or service.
Put differently, should the consumer be protected when freely exercising his right of
choice, what interest of his should be protected, how and against what is he protected?
The wheel of commerce grinds when the consumer is active. When the
consumer meets his needs, suppliers of goods and services are activated, and in the
producers bid to meet the ever increasing needs of the consumer commerce thrives
with a consequential flourishing effect on the economy. This way, the consumer is
projected as the king, he activates the course of commerce, the producer and service
provider would only be ready to produce goods and provide services when the
consumer is ready to pay for them.  But is the consumer always the king? Reflecting
on this, Monye portrays a picture of the consumer thus:
It is a truism that there is high incidence of fake and substandard products ... The
problem, ... cuts across various fields including ... the supply of services. Most
often, consumers find themselves saddled with shoddy services, or even non-
performance. Unfortunately, they rarely seek redress due to a number of reasons,
the most prominent reason being ignorance .... The supply of shoddy products
and services constitutes a big problem to the consumer2.
This expression, which finds support in several commentaries3,  reveals that the
consumer is anything but the king he ought to be, that the consumer is in a sordid
state. A typical legal rationale for protecting the consumer is based on the notion of
policing market failures, dishonesty and inefficiencies, such as inequalities of
bargaining power between a consumer and a business4. The need for the consumer
to be protected therefore arises.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Bureaucrats view consumer concern as a matter within the dominion of public law.
To them, consumers concern, that is, issue of defective and adulterated products,
shoddy services, exorbitant prices, and other forms of unfair trade practices impact
negatively on the state, and is indeed a threat to public safety. To bureaucrats, injury
caused to one consumer as a result of unwholesome trade practice portends danger
to the entire public. It becomes imperative for the state to protect itself and the
populace from the antics of unscrupulous producers and service providers by way of
administrative intervention. There is a conscious legal policy by the government
inspired by the recognition of the vulnerable position which the consumer occupies
in the market place5.  The government has sought to ensure the protection of consumer
by assigning specific functions to some governmental agencies6.  Furthermore,
administrative intervention institutionalising appropriate legal framework has been
put in place, leading to the creation of some regulatory agencies. The agencies are
vested with authority to supervise, monitor and regulate the activities of producers
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The Consumer Protection Council established by the Consumer Protection
Council Act7  is the most direct consumer administrative agency in Nigeria, others
are the National Agency for Food and Drugs Administration and Control8  to control
and standardise the manufacture, importation, sale, advertisement of regulated
products such as food and drugs, the Standard Organisation of Nigeria9  to safeguard
product standards, and the Nigerian Communications Commission10  set up to carter
for the interests of consumers of telecommunication services, the Utilities Charges
Commission11 to guard against the exploitation of consumers in the rates charged
for public utilities, the National Insurance Commission12  set up to carter for consumer
insurance interests, and the Nigerian Tourism Development Corporation13  set up to
encourage the provision and management of tourism amenities including the
development, regulation, registration, classification of hotels, and hospitality
enterprises14.
These agencies are conferred with extensive functions relating to setting of
standard, control of quality, and investigation of consumer complaints15.  Their
mandates are basically administrative in nature, they seek to regulate the production,
supply and provision of goods and services. The Consumer Protection Council being
the most direct consumer protection agency in Nigeria merits some detailed comments
here. The Council was established perhaps to fall in line with the United Nations
Guidelines on Consumer Protection16.  The mandate of the Council covers both
goods and services and its functions17  include providing speedy redress to consumer
complaints through negotiations, mediation and conciliation; eliminating hazardous
products from the market, and causing offenders to replace defective products with
safer and more appropriate alternatives; publishing from time to time list of products
whose consumption and sale have been banned, withdrawn, restricted or not approved
within or outside the country; issue guidelines to manufacturers, importers, dealers
and wholesalers in relation to their obligation under the Act; encourage trade industry
and professional associations to develop and enforce in their various fields quality
standards designed to safeguard the interest of the consumer and encourage the
formation of voluntary consumer groups or associations for consumer well being.
The Council is charged with the administrative responsibility of ensuring
that consumers' interests receive due consideration at appropriate forum and providing
redress in cases of unscrupulous exploitation of consumers by producers and service
providers18. The Council is empowered to apply to court to prevent the circulation of
products which constitute imminent public hazard; compel a manufacturer to certify
that all safety standards are met in their products; cause quality test to be conducted
on consumer products; demand production of label showing date and place of
manufacture of a product and certification of compliance; compel manufacturers,
dealers or service providers to give public notice of health hazards inherent in their
products; and ban the sale, distribution and advertisement of products which do not
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The mandate of the Council focuses on the health and safety of consumers
by empowering the Council to eliminate oppressive trade practices, through unfair
bargains, consumer education and information, and adequate compensation and relief
for consumers who have suffered injuries from defective goods and services. By
section 4 of the Act, State Committees are established to assist the Council in
realisation of its mandate. There is a consensus by writers19 that the Council and the
State Committees are administrative bodies that discharge her mandate by the
instrumentality of the criminal law process20.  Monye, has queried whether an
aggrieved consumer who has obtained redress through the Council or State Committee
may maintain a civil action against the offending producer or service provider21. She
contends that to allow the consumer maintain such a civil action in addition to the
action taken by the Council or State Committee will weaken the position of the
Council or State Committee, which took pains to investigate the complaint with a
view to securing appropriate remedy for the consumer, and further raises the issue of
double jeopardy against the accused person22.
Monye concludes that the better approach was to give the consumer the option
to seek redress either through the Council or State Committee, or to institute a civil
action to enforce his right23.  This position, though probably premised on the desire
to encourage the Council in actualising its mandate and in securing the right of the
accused producer, appears not to be supported by law. Firstly, there is nothing in the
Act or any other law in Nigeria that bars a consumer who has been injured or otherwise
affected by defect in goods or services supplied to him from enforcing his civil
claims against such a producer or provider of services, by reason only that he has
lodged a complaint against the said producer or service provider to the Council or
State Committee.
Secondly, while the Act empowers the Council to investigate cases of unfair
trade practices and enforce compliance against unscrupulous traders, the
Constitution24  guarantees the consumer's right to institute an action against anyone
who infringes or threatens to infringe his constitutionally guaranteed rights25.  Thirdly,
besides lodging a complaint to the Council or State Committee, it does not seem that
the consumer is empowered by the Act to compel the Council or Committee to
prosecute or take any action at all against the producer or provider of services
complaint about. The consumer does not have any authority to direct the Council or
Committee in the discharge of its duties before, during, or after its investigation of
the complaint.
It is humbly submitted, that in addition to lodging a complaint against any
producer or provider of defective goods or services, the consumer reserves his right
to enforce his claims by civil action. It has been expressed that if the Council
effectively discharges its mandate, “it will go a long way in redressing consumer
complaints and improving the power relations of consumer viz-a-viz producers
[sic]”.26  The establishment of the Council is an important government policy, and it
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It is important to note that administratively, consumer policy focuses on
two strategies in the protection of consumer27.  One is the preventive strategy
which objective is to prevent the consumer from getting injured in the first place.
The objectives of the Standards Organisations of Nigeria (SON) and the
National Agency for Food and Drugs Administration and Control (NAFDAC)
fall primarily into this category. Two, is the redress strategy which involves providing
appropriate compensation or redress to an injured consumer. The objectives of
the Consumer Protection Council (CPC) as a regulatory agency fall into this category.
Generally, an amalgam of the two strategies is needful to have an effective consumer
protection regime.
From the foregoing, an inter-relationship of functions of these administrative
agencies is unavoidable. It is instructive to note that a jurisdictional conflict is hardly
to be avoided. An effective government policy is necessary to be institutionalised
for the proper management of the inter-relationship of functions to prevent the
imminent conflict from impacting negatively on the consumers. However, doubt
has been expressed as to whether the consumer can pursue a claim for injury or
defect in products against a regulatory agency on the ground that he relied on the
agency's quality assurance on a product to consume the product, which turned out to
be harmful to him28.
JUDICIAL ATTITUDE TO CONSUMERS PROTECTION IN NIGERIA
The judiciary is generally seen as the last hope of the common man; the hope of the
hopeless, the help of the helpless, and the safe sanatorium for the legally injured29.
In the power relation between the consumer and the producer, the consumer is seen
as a weeping child, the common man. He therefore looks up to the court for protection
from the antics and vagaries of unscrupulous businessmen, who would usually resort
to sharp and unfair  trade practices  to maximize profits at the consumer's expense.
The incidences of the supply of deficient and adulterated goods, coupled with
provision of shoddy services in the market place have assumed an alarming situation
in Nigeria30.  To check this tide, a variety of approaches have been adopted for the
protection of the consumer.
The judiciary provides the primary venue for obtaining redress in consumer
protection matters. From the judicial perspective therefore, consumption is perceive
as one of the rights of citizens31. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
provides for fundamental right to citizen.  Section 33 of the Constitution provides
for right to life. This presupposes the right to consume safe food, water, air, services
and other articles for the sustenance of the citizen's life. It would seem that the
judiciary views issue of consumer protection as a matter that is very fundamental
and near life threatening in Nigeria as reflected in the possible dangers adulterated
and fake products pose to the life of the consumer. Commenting on the susceptible
state of the Nigerian consumer, Aniagolu, JSC, in Nigerian Bottling Co. Ltd. v
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Nothing  appears to be  more  elementary in  this country  where  it  is  often  the
unhappy lot of  the consumers to be inflicted with shoddy and unmerchantable
goods by some pretentious manufacturers, entrepreneurs, shady middlemen and
unprincipled retailers whose avowed interest seems only, and always, to be to
maximise their profits leaving honesty a discounted and shattered commodity.
This expression by the apex court in the land would give the impression that our
consumer protection is given the highest attention by the court. In reality, consumer
protection appears to be a concept that is yet to be fully acknowledged by the court.
This position reflects in the dictum of Edozie, JCA in Hill Station Hotel Ltd. v
Adeyi, when he said, "I have myself scanned through the law of the country but have
not been able to find any statute bearing on the subject Hotel Proprietors' and
Innkeepers' liability33.  It seems doubtful if there exists any law in this country similar
to the English Hotel Proprietors Act (1956)34".  This expression by His Lordship is
bereft of support, and for a number of reasons reveals the shallowness of the judiciary
in the perception of consumer protection matters. His Lordship proceeded as if the
Statute (of General Application)/common law distinction in bailment was inapplicable
in Nigeria35.
The expression which appears to be a mirror of the attitude of the court to
consumer protection in Nigeria can be said to be a product of hastily conclusion.
First, historically, the regulation of common inns and hotels, the concern in the case,
was through the common law. At common law innkeepers were held strictly liable
for the loss of their guests' goods, a position that was given statutory flavour by the
English Innkeepers Act of 136836.  By the peculiar colonial status of Nigeria, one
wonders why His Lordship did not have recourse to common law or the English
Act37.  Secondly, it is difficult to concede to His Lordship that in 1996 when Hill
Station Hotel was decided there were no local legislation in Nigeria similar to the
English Hotel proprietors Act. Statutory regulation of hotel and hotel proprietorship
in Nigeria is within the ambit of the legislative powers of the state38.
This is as a result of the review of pre-1900 English Statutes of General
Application by the Law Reform Commission in 1987 whereby certain laws were
assigned to the states. The Draft Laws which were the product of that exercise were
sent to the states for purposes of enacting them as their local legislation39.  Some
states like Akwa Ibom and Kaduna complied, hence the enactment of the Innkeepers
and Hotel Proprietors Law of Akwa Ibom State40 and the Innkeepers and Hotel
Proprietors Edict of Kaduna State41. It follows therefore that as at 1996 when His
Lordship made the expression, there were the Innkeepers and Hotel Proprietors Edict
1988 of Rivers State and 1990 of Kaduna State. It is with this legislation on hotels
and inns that this study is concerned. It can therefore not be said that there are no
local legislation on this subject matter in Nigeria. Although out courts are enjoined
by law to take judicial notice of all legislation42,  possibilities are that the courts may
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Although, the concurrent judgment of Aniagolu, JSC in Ngonadi's case appear
to have brought the consumer something to cheers about, it is however doubtful if
the cheers were not short-lived. With Ngonadi decided in 1985 by the Supreme
Court, the legal development of consumer protection in Nigeria would by far be
quite advanced today43.  This does not appear to be the case. In most of the cases that
followed Ngonadi44  the courts' decisions did not seem to reflect the charge by
Aniagolu, JSC. In Anyah v Imo Concorde Hotels Ltd. & 2 Ors45, the appellant had
gone to Owerri for a book launch. He went to the 1st respondent's hotel and booked
for accommodation for a night. At the gate of the hotel, the 2nd and 3rd respondents,
who were the hotel security men on duty, registered the number plate of the appellant's
car, and issued him with a plastic disc No. 2.  The appellant drove in, parked his car
in the parking space of the hotel, and checked into the room allocated to him.
In the morning the appellant checked out of the hotel but discovered that his
car had been stolen. He reported the matter to the hotel management. The appellant
then sued the respondents for the value of the car and other expenses incurred as a
result of the absence of the car, alleging that the respondents were negligent in
allowing his car to be stolen. The respondents denied owing the appellant any duty
in respect of his car for which performance they were negligent. The High Court
entered judgment for the appellant, but which the Court of Appeal upturned. Upon
appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment of the Court of Appeal was allowed,
leaving the consumer without a remedy. In this case, the Supreme Court ostensibly
placed a near impossible to discharge burden of proof on the consumer, when it said,
per Kalgo JSC:
... the appellant gave evidence  of the loss of his car but gave  no  detailed evidence
of the fact and circumstance giving rise to the loss of the car. Nor did he explain
the relationship between him and the respondents upon which the duty of care for
his car would arise, and how that duty was breached46.
It is doubtful how the court expects this burden "of giving detailed evidence
of how the car was stolen" to be discharge by a consumer, in matter which was not
argued under bailment. Where it is under bailment, the burden of proof would have
been shifted to the respondent to disprove his negligence. His Lordship expressed
that if the appellant had after being given the plastic or metal disc, parked his car,
locked it up, gave the key to the hotel security men and drew their attention to where
he parked the car, then there may arise a duty of care on the part of the security men
to ensure that the car was safe47. Or had the appellant established that the respondents
left the gate unattended and the car was driven out through the gate, only then would
the appellant discharge the onus of the existence of a prima facie duty of care48.
These were however not to be. One wonders if these facts were or could be within
the knowledge of the consumer. Certainly, a man who parked his car and went to
sleep could not have seen the car being removed to be expected to give such detailed
evidence of the removal of the car as required by the court. Also, a sleeping man
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out. It is doubtful if any consumer in the circumstances of this case can discharge
this onerous burden of proof49.
On the issue of relationship between the appellant and the respondent to
warrant a duty of care for the car to arise, one is taken aback that in circumstance,
where the appellant was given the hotel disk to enter and park in the hotel premises
after his car number plate had been registered by the hotel security men, the court
still demanded of the appellant evidence of duty of care for the car. The appellant
did not just drive his car into the hotel, he went through all the security processes
required of him by the hotel, as directed by the latter's security men. The burden of
proof placed on the consumer in this case was quite onerous. Commentators are
agreed that in placing such onerous burden of proof on the consumer, the Nigerian
courts appear unmindful of the fact that the allocation of the burden of proof is
usually resolved by policy consideration, fairness and probability50.  If these
considerations were brought to bear by the Supreme Court in deciding Anyah, it is
doubtful if the near impossible to discharge burden of proof would have still been
placed on the consumer, the result would have probably been to place the burden of
disproving negligence on the respondent, and not vice visa.
One wonders why the Supreme Court came to the decision in Anyah's case
without adverting to the English case of Williams v Linnitt51,  which facts were in all
fours with Anyah's case. The facts of Williams' case are that the Plaintiff stopped at
the Defendant's inns, parked his car in the inns' car park, which had a disclaimer of
liability notice displaced, and had drinks with his friends at the inn. An hour later the
Plaintiff found that his car had been stolen.  The English Court of Appeal held that
the car park was within the hospitium of the inn. The court considered the following
facts: that the car park was contiguous to the inn and one in which a guest with a car
was customarily invited to leave it; that no evidence was adduced that the inn provided
an alternative accommodation for cars; and that part of the inn's normal business
was to provide accommodation for the cars of guests.
The court held that the Defendant was liable and that the notice at the car
park did not relieve the inn of its liability. Neither the parties nor the court in Anya's
case relied on Williams' case. It would appear that the court would have reached a
different decision if it had adverted to Williams' case. Although Williams' case was
based on the relevant English Law, the spirit underlying it, which is, to protect
lodgers52,  is recommended for adoption in Nigeria. In addition, the consumer in
Kabo Air Ltd v Oladipo53 did not fare any better. Although this is a Court of Appeal
decision, the court seems to have been guided by the binding precedent of the Supreme
Court in Ibidapo v Lufthansa Airline54. The facts of the two cases are in pari materia55.
In Kabo Air, the respondent boarded the appellant's aircraft on December 30,
1994 from Kaduna to Lagos to attend a family wedding and to celebrate the New
Year with his family. He checked in his luggage and was issued with a luggage tag.
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into the aircraft he boarded. He lodged a complaint with the appellant, but was asked
to await the arrival of the appellants' next flight from Kaduna. On arrival that flight
did not have the luggage. The respondent cut short his holiday and returned to Kaduna
as he could neither attend the wedding nor the New Year celebration with his family.
The respondent sued the appellant at the Kaduna State High Court claiming special
and general damages.
The appellant was not represented at the trial, the respondent  led evidence
and obtained judgment. The appellant filed an application at the trial court praying
the court to set aside its judgment. The application was dismissed, whereupon the
appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. Unanimously allowing the appeal, the
Court held that the Carriage by Air (Non-International Carriage) (Colonies,
Protectorates and Trust Territories) Order of 1953 is an existing law and is applicable
in Nigeria as earlier held by the Supreme Court in Ibidapo. The court also held that
the State High Court had no jurisdiction to have tried the matter in view of the
Federal High Court (Amendment) Decree of 199156.
The consumer in this case was left disappointed. It is instructive to note that
the relationship between an air carrier and its passenger in relation to the carriage of
goods and luggage is one bailment, where a duty exists for the bailee to deliver the
article to the bailor upon request. The relationship is also regulated by the Warsaw
Convention adopted by the 1953 Order. While liability regime in bailment appears
more liberal and consumer friendly, the decision in the case of Kabo Air does not
seem to portray this. The court appears to have sacrificed the consumer's interest in
that case on the altar of technicalities. One wonders why the court allowed
technicalities to defeat the cause of the consumers in Kabo Air and Ibidapo when the
circumstances of loss of luggage in both cases, that is, common carriers and air
travellers, were similar to the loss suffered by the consumer in  Halliburton v Chapele57
and Hill Station Hotel Ltd. v Adeyi58. It would appear that if the court adverted to
consumer policy consideration and fairness in arriving at it decision in Kabo Air
possibilities are that a different decision would have been reached by the court.
Although the consumer appeared to have had cause to smile in the more
recent case of Edward Okwejiminor v Gbakeji and Nigerian Bottling Co. Plc.59,  as
will be seen shortly, the case compounded the consumer's dilemma. The fact of the
case has it that Mr. Edward Okwejiminor, the appellant at the Supreme Court, returned
from work hungry and thirsty. He reached for a bottle of Fanta orange from a crate
he purchased from the 1st respondent. While drinking the Fanta orange, he allegedly
felt some sediments and rubbish down his throat. He stopped halfway and took a
closer look at the content of the bottle and found that it contained a dead cockroach.
To the appellant, the quantity of the Fanta that he took gave him much
discomfort, which led to incessant spitting and loss of appetite. He later developed
stomach pain and was rushed to the hospital, where he was diagnosed as suffering
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analysis. The trial High Court held that the particulars of negligence pleaded by the
plaintiff were proved and entered judgment in favour of the plaintiff. The 2nd
respondent, Nigerian Bottling Co. (NBC) Plc., appealed to the Court of Appeal, that
court allowed the appeal and entered judgment for the NBC60. Dissatisfied with the
Court of Appeal decision, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme
unanimously allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal and
restored that of the High Court. Concern was however raised for consumers when
the Court held per Muhammed JSC, that from the totality of the evidence adduced,
it would amount to a serious miscarriage of justice to hold Gbakeji, the 1st respondent,
who was the retailer of the drink liable.
The statement by His Lordship on Gbakeji, seems to have adjusted the
principle in the tort of negligence. Until then, the general perception was that those
in the chain of distribution could not absolve themselves from liability on the sole
excuse that they were not the manufacturers. It was believed that on the principle of
joint and several tortfeasors, the retailer or the consumer could claim contribution
from the manufacturers. The rationale for this could have been that the victim/
consumer may not be able to reach the manufacturers, especially for imported product.
Whereas, the retailer is more often than not known and accessible by the consumer,
the manufacturer may never be known or reached by him. Nevertheless, there exists
privity contract between the retailer and consumer (buyer), which by principle of
contract may exclude the manufacturer. Under the provisions of the Sale of Goods
Laws the retailer (seller) owes a duty to the consumer that the goods he is selling are
not only free of defect, fit for the required purpose, but also of good quality61.
In Ngonadi's case the Supreme Court held to the effect that section 15(a) of
the Sale of Goods Law of Bendel State62 does not draw a distinction between
manufacturer and retailer and that both can be liable for breach of implied warranty
as to fitness. In the words of Oputa, JSC, "Section 15(a) ... does not draw that
distinction. In express language, its provision apply 'whether he is the manufacturer
or not.' Secondly it is far too late in the day to draw that distinction [going by the
principle of Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson]63"  In contract the retailer's liability
is indisputable. Accordingly, the retailer's liability was not only allowed by the law
of tort, but also by contract.
The distinction, Oputa JSC was referring to, which is now commonly known
as the Atkinian principle, is that between the retailer and manufacturer in relation to
liability. His Lordship's expression was merely a restatement of the law of negligence,
where anyone in the distribution chain can be held liable. The pronouncement of
Muhammed, JSC, in respect of the retailer's liability did not leave the position
expressed in the Atkinian principle which was re-echoed by the same Supreme Court
in Ngonadi's case undisturbed. It can rightly be asserted that by Okwejiminor the
consumer's dilemma was compounded as the Supreme Court succeeded in throwing
more spanners into the works of consumer protection, apparently taking away with
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The court must be considered as one of the institutions for the advancement
of consumer protection, the other being the legislative administrative processes.
Horowitz identifies six distinguishing characteristics which not only differentiate
the adjudicative process from the other process, but equally serve as the institutional
limitations of the court64. One, adjudication is focused and essentially deals with
individual rights and duties, and not necessarily with broad policy issues. Two, the
courts have a limited variety of remedies compared with the broader range of
alternatives available to the other institutions. Three, adjudication is piecemeal, and
is rather apposite for a gradual adjustment.
Four, courts are passive and reactive, and so make litigation ex post facto.
Fifth, facts finding in adjudication is ill-suited to ascertaining broad social facts
concerning the broad policy issues raised in individual cases. Six, adjudication makes
no provision for monitoring and assessment of the unintended behavioural impact
of decisions and policy review. He sums up by asserting that these limited
characteristics are more or less important depending on judicial familiarity with the
regulatory are concern65.
An assessment66 of the level of familiarity of our courts with consumer
protection regulatory concerns leaves much to be desired. Horowitz' assertion in
respect of institutional limitation of the courts has come under attack by Chayes67.
Chayes identified the following as the institutional advantages for the duties the
courts assumes. One, is that the judicial process is presided over by a judge or
magistrate whose professional ethics separates him from undue political pressures.
Two, is that the judicial process allows ad hoc applications of broad national policy
in situations of limited scope, where solutions are adapted to meet the need of a
particular condition and flexibility administered as experience develops. Three, is
that the judicial process allows a relatively high degree of participation by those
who will be directly affected by the decision or their representatives. Four, is that the
information required and used by the courts to arrive at a decision is often not filtered
through the rigid structures and preconceptions of bureaucracies. Five, is that the
judicial process is an effective mechanism for registering and responding to grievances
generated in a regulatory state as it responds to the complaints of the aggrieved.
The task here is that of balancing the importance of competing policy interests
in any specific situation. Six, is that the judiciary is non-bureaucratic in nature, with
the advantage of tapping the energies and resources outside itself and government in
the exploration of the situations and the assessment of remedies as it does not work
through a rigid, multilayered hierarchy of numerous officials, but through a small,
representative task force, assembled ad hoc, and easily dismantled when the problem
is eventually resolved68. Chayes argument has been noted to be generalised within
the specific cultural, legal and political realm of the United States of America69.
It is doubtful if it is apposite for Nigeria which has a legal system akin to the
English, with the Common law tradition. Even though developed by the Americans
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constitutional matters, the concept of "judicial restraint" has been generally expressed
within the common law realm70.  Adumbrating on this, Justice Uwais, then CJN
expressed to the effect that judicial self restraint has given rise to the doctrine of
locu standi, "or the interest which a person must have to invoke the court's intervention
in constitutional cases. This according to His Lordship resulted in a deliberate policy
to avoid adjudication of such cases, which he regarded as "self imposed" than inherent.
He sums up by describing the process as "... an attitude motivated by self restraint
which finds practical expression in a policy of avoidance71".
The expression of His Lordship, though made in respect of exercise of judicial
review of legislative action, is of paramount relevance in the wider issue of when or
when not to hold torfeasor liable by a court. This issue transcends the borders of
Nigeria, as Lord Dinning in Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co.72,  divided his fellow
judges into two categories, that is, category one being the timorous souls who were
fearful of allowing a new cause of action, and category two being the bold souls who
were ready to allow it if justice so required. From this categorisation, and attitude
of our courts in consumer protection, one is tempted to conclude that our judges
are rather reluctant and develop heavy hand in making pronouncement that
involve consumer's right. Considering the line up of cases reviewed herein, the
temptation is to wonder if the Supreme Court in Anyah's case did not allow a rare
opportunity of developing and entrenching a positive judicial policy on consumer
protection to slip away.
CONCLUSION
One of the purposes of law is that law must solve the changing problems of the
society. It can be gleaned from this study that the present institutional framework in
place in Nigeria is far from meeting the needs of the consumer. From the line-up of
cases reviewed in this study, it is obvious that beside the problem of lack of appropriate
legislation, the court has hardly been able to rise to the occasion, whenever a consumer
approaches it for redress. It would appear that what is required is legislative
intervention. Until then judicial activitism is the only lifeline available to the
consumer. Adumbrating judicial activism, Oputa, JSC posits:
We [the judiciary] are not to fold our hands and do nothing. No. Our judges have
to so interpret the law that it makes sense to our citizens in distress and assure
them of equal protection of the law, equal freedom under the law, and equal justice.
And this is what judicial activism is all about73.
His Lordship went on to identify Lord Denning as a judge whose activism
impacted positively on the state and litigants.  According to him, several "jurisdictions
have been positively affected by Denning's activism and many of their judges have
adopted his approach of making law a handmaid of justice and making law solve the
changing needs of dynamic society -  The Sociology of Law.74" Protection the
consumer is a social challenge in Nigeria, and social justice require the hunc et
munc- the here and now, it entails solving social problems that now exist with lawsInternational Journal of Advanced Legal Studies and Governance, Vol.2, No.1, April 2011 45
and legal procedures tailored to suit the peculiar circumstances of the society.
To protect the Nigerian consumer requires the progressive application the fundamental
principles of the constitution and international policies like the United Nations
Guidelines on Consumer Protection and the Model Law for Consumer Protection in
Africa, the principles of equity, justice and purposeful advancement of the consumer
welfare.
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